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Abstract
BACKGROUND: Recently, oil and gas industries have focused on risk-based methods to specifically compile 
inspection, maintenance, and management strategies worldwide.
AIM: The provided method in this study is a management tool to recognize and then prioritize the equipment’s 
risks and, consequently, propose an inspection plan based on these risks. In fact, it is a risk analysis aspect of an 
inspection plan for industrial equipment.
MATERIALS AND METHODS: The study is performed on de-ethanizer unit, considering variety of process 
equipment including distillation tower, exchanger, pressure vessel, drum, and related piping. To initiate the study, 
first, the risk-based inspection (RBI) team formed, then all required data were gathered and 22 equipment were 
identified based on the method.
RESULTS: After RBI be performed and risks are estimated, 13.6% of equipment rated on high risk, 63.63% rated on 
medium risk, and 22.72% rated on low-risk classification. Based on specific risk criteria for equipment, we determined 
new parameters as inspection level and type of inspection and finally integrated them. As one of the obtained results, 
the overhaul maintenance of the unit was postponed to a later time and for equipment that should inspect before 
this year, reduction risk strategy and advance none distractive test defined, and their inspection time also postpone 
to 2015 from 2012 to 2013.
CONCLUSION: This decision results in saving a shutdown cost, inspection cost, reduction of failure, and increasing 
of equipment reliability factor. The result of this study will be helpful to assist similar industries improving their risk 
management plans.
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Introduction
Inspection is widely used in process industries 
to reduce the frequency of failures in fixed equipment, 
such as piping that is prone to damage the equipment in 
petrochemical plants [1], [2]. Performing inspection in the 
industry makes it possible to determine the conditions 
leading to irreparable events in terms of damage to 
persons, equipment, and the environment. By carrying 
out inspections, failure mechanisms can be identified, 
monitored, and controlled and then the time to failures 
around critical points can be estimated [3], [4], [5].
Risk-based inspection (RBI)
Different tools are available to assist decision-
makers to develop specific plans for inspections. One of 
these tools is the RBI method, which could be applied in 
chemical, petrochemical, refinery, oil, and gas industries. 
The successful implementation of RBI had been 
mentioned in multiple studies which were performed 
previously [6], [7], [8]. Based on Pareto prinzciple, about 
80% of equipment failures are associated with only 20% 
of equipment. Therefore, it would be an extremely useful 
action to provide a prioritized list of performed inspections 
(Figure 1). In RBI methodology, this priority is considered 
as the function of the risk of equipment failure and 
consequences of such failure [9], [10], [11]. In this work, 
the definition of risk from RBI aspect of view and way of 
its assessment would be discussed in more detail. This 
method enables industry owners to take into account a 
range of key factors in their decision-making processes, 
such as the level of reliability of equipment, as well as 
safety, health and the environment, and financial issues.
It is evident that the RBI methodologies have 
more advantages comparing to the conventional 
inspection methods. It is generally due to the risk 
assessment capability to provide more accurate 
data to evaluate the functionally status of the major 
components and then optimize the related operating and 
maintenance time scheduling [12], [13]. This method is 
a tool that helps to prioritize maintenance operations. 
The performed studies in power distribution systems 
have revealed that the most common system failures 
contributors are of a few high-risk components [14].
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Figure 1: Total risk versus quantity of equipment
RBI is generally considered as a maintenance 
method relied upon risk analysis and is of high importance 
for prioritizing and organizing the maintenance activities 
on the equipmentures contributor’s AR according to the 
obtained results from the conducted risk assessment, 
the RBI approach gives guidance on what, when, 
where, and how to inspect, and also, what should be 
documented.
There are different approaches to perform 
RBI, reflecting variations in preferred methodology 
for demonstrating the material degradation and the 
probabilistic treatment. Some researchers promote an 
expert-based (subjective) methodology, for example, 
Kallen and Noortwijk, who approved a Bayesian 
approach for treatment errors in equipment wall 
thickness measurements [15]. Others prefer a more 
traditional frequency-based probability assessment 
approach. However, differences exist, the fundamental 
pillars are common; they are presented by accredited 
technical references such as API [16] and DNV [17]; 
also, Jovanovic [10], Kallen [18], and Khan et al. [19].
Semi-quantitative RBI approach
The RBI method can be used qualitatively, 
quantitatively, or by applying parts of both (i.e., semi-
quantitatively). Each methodology provides a systematic 
technique to display the risk, identify areas of concern, 
and create a prioritized list for a comprehensive 
inspection. Through these methods, each considers a 
risk ranking value to be applied for assessing separately 
the likelihood of failure (LOF) and the potential 
consequence of failure (COF). These two measures are 
then combined to estimate the risk of failure [7], [20]. 
Semi-quantitative RBI methodology gives us aspects 
resulting from both the qualitative and quantitative 
procedures. It facilitates to achieve the main benefits of 
both methodologies (e.g., precision of the quantitative 
and calculating speed of the qualitative). Usually, 
most of the data used in a quantitative methodology 
are required to this method but with fewer detail. The 
approach also may not be as rigorous as those applied 
for the quantitative methodology. The results are typically 
given in consequence and probability classifications or 
as risk scores, but numerical values may be related to 
each classification to permit the calculation of risk and 
the use of suitable risk acceptance measures. Figure 2 
shows a typical RBI process from the latest edition of 
API RP 580 (2016) [21].
Figure 2: Risk-based inspection planning process (API RP 580)
Study Methodology Materials and 
Methods
The present study is conducted in Arya Sasol 
Polymer Company (ASPC), through its Olefin unit, 
and specifically on de-ethanizer section, which has 22 
process equipment such as tower, pressure vessels, 
and exchangers. The RBI study performed by holding 
expert review meetings for each item specified in the 
project scope.
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Risk is the combination of the probability 
of an event occurring during a time period and the 
consequences (generally negative) associated with the 
event. In mathematical terms, risk could be calculated 
by the following equation:
Risk = Probability × Consequence
This methodology applies to equipment failure 
likelihood based on API 581 standard; subsequently, 
the consequences of the failures of the equipment in 
“ASPC” are combined to estimate the related risk.
Below discusses the main two steps to estimate 
both the event consequence and related probability.
Assessing COF
The consequence, which represents the 
outcome of an event, is going to be estimated in a 
semi-quantitative approach. The COF associated with 
a particular item is assumed as a loss of containment 
which has already occurred. In this procedure, COF 
refers to COF and it ranges from 0 to 1. The COF is 
used to represent the allocated value for consequence.
The COF consists of three factors, including 
safety, Csaf. (up to 33% of total consequence), pollution, 
Cpol. (up to 17% of total consequence), and production, 
Cprod. (up to 50% of total consequence). Total 
consequence, based on these factors, is calculated 
using the following equation and Table 1 presents the 
classification for COF:
[Casf + Cpol+Cprod]C =
12
= Normalizedconsequence withvalue0 to1 (1)
Table 1: Consequence of failure classification
COF category COF (0–1)
N 0–0.2
L 0.2–0.4
M 0.4–0.6
H 0.6–0.8
E 0.8–1
COF: Consequence of failure.
Safety consequence factor (Csaf )
This factor aims to consider the impact of a loss of 
containment or injury to personnel in the vicinity of the loss 
of containment. It consists of four parameters, including 
temperature (Ft), pressure (Fp), inventory (Fi), and inventory 
size (Fis). The amount of consequence associated with 
these parameters, i.e., temperature, pressure, inventory, 
and inventory size is calculated as below:
Ft ×Fp×Fi×FisCsaf = (Max value=4)
25  (2)
Temperature element (Ft) is considered that the 
greatest hazard to personnel is when fluids operate at high 
or low temperatures (Table 2). Items where temperatures 
are in excess of 70°C would be expected to cause injury to 
personnel if contacted, and similarly, temperatures <−10°C 
(applicable to gas releases, where Joules-Thomson 
auto-refrigeration occurs on pressure drop or areas with 
liquefied gas containment). A high personnel risk has 
been assigned for temperature <−10°C and above 70°C. 
Pressure element (Fp) considered that the hazard from a 
loss of containment is proportional to the pressure of the 
system involved. The following pressure factors (Table 2) 
have been applied in this assessment. Inventory element 
(Fi) considered that hazard from a loss of containment is 
proportional to the perceived flammability, toxicity, and type 
(vapor/liquid and etc.) of the inventory involved. Inventory 
risk factor elements for all inventories must be determined 
by process optimization department and valued from 1 to 
5 (e.g., air and water are 1, acid and caustic are 3, and 
process gas or cracked gas is 5). Inventory size element 
(Fis) considered that the greatest hazard to personnel 
exists with the release of the highest available amount 
of flammable inventory. This assessment assumes that if 
a leak were to occur in any item (transmission flow line, 
pipework, or vessel), all available inventories within a 
particular ESDV or control valve, envelope is available for 
release. The following temperature element (Ft), pressure 
element (Fp), and inventory size elements (Table 2) have 
been utilized in this method:
Table 2: Temperature, pressure, and inventory size elements 
risk assessment
Items Ranges Consequence
Temperature (°C) T < −10, T > 70 2
−10 ≤ T≤ 70 1
Pressure (brag) p ≥ 30 5
10 ≤ p < 30 4
5 ≤ p < 10 3
0.5 ≤ p < 5 2
p < 0.5 1
Inventory size element (l) V ≥ 5000 2
500 ≤ V < 5000 1.9
50 ≤ V < 500 1.8
20 ≤ V < 50 1.6
V < 20 1.4
V = 0* 1
Pollution consequence factor (Cpol.)
The consequences associated with pollution 
refers to the time after the loss of containment occurs and 
the pollution inventory is released to the atmosphere, 
i.e., when a polluted liquid leak overfills deck drains 
and bunds and enters the ground and natural drains 
are considered as a pollution consequence. After 
the pollution gas released to the atmosphere, the 
risk related to pollution relies on its impact on human 
and fauna. Pollution risk factor element (Cpol) for all 
inventories was determined by process optimization 
department and valued from 0 to 2 (e.g., air and water 
are 0, acid and caustic are 2, and process gas is 1).
Production consequence factor (Cprod.)
The production consequence risk ranking 
(Cprod) refers to the effect of the failure of a particular 
item on production. It is the product of two factors, as 
shown below:
Cprod = Frep. Fop (max value = 6)
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Where Frep is a repair factor and ranges from 
1 to 2 and Fop is operability factor and ranges from 
1 to 3. Frep depends on the complexity of repairing an 
item that has failed due to corrosion; values of Frep 
have assigned as in Table 3.
Table 3: Repair factor
Item affected Repair factor (Frep)
Description Characteristic
Pressure vessel PWHT 2.0
Not PWHT 1.8
Pipework PWHT – all diameters 2.0
Not PWHT – diameters 12” and higher 1.8
Not PWHT – over 2” and up to 12” 1.6
2” and below 1.3
Transmission flow line As welded or PWHT all diameters 2.0
PWHT: Post-weld heat treatment.
Fop refers to the period of time that takes to 
the failed item to remain in shut down status until it has 
repaired and/or replaced. This could result in a significant 
loss of production. The effect of the failure on production 
is taken into account by the operability factor (Fop) 
supplied in Table 4. This covers three possible cases.
Table 4: Operability factor
Effect on production Operability factor (Fop)
No production possible (any event leading to a total shutdown) 3
Loss in production (partial or system shutdown involving 
some deferment)
2
No effect (events which do not result in deferment) 1
Assessing LOF
In an RBI program, the likelihood analysis 
is conducted to estimate the likelihood of a specific 
consequence resulting from a loss of containment. The 
LOC usually occurs due to degradation mechanism(s). 
According to API 581 standard, the likelihood factor is 
the sum of six factors, including (1) Remaining life factor 
(RLF), (2) damage factor (DF), (3) inspection factor 
(IF), (4) condition factor (CCF), (5) process factor (PF), 
and (6) mechanical design factor (MDF). Thereupon, 
the LOF category is determined as below:
LOF = RLF+DF+IF+CCF+PF+MDF
The likelihood category is determined from the 
likelihood factor using the following logic:
•	 If likelihood factor is 0–15: Likelihood category 
is 1
•	 If likelihood factor is 16–25: Likelihood category 
is 2
•	 If likelihood factor is 26–35: Likelihood category 
is 3
•	 If likelihood factor is 36–50: Likelihood category 
is 4
• If likelihood factor is 51–75: Likelihood category 
is 5.
RLF
API 581 standard was used to calculate LOF 
of the six main factors; one of these factors called 
equipment factor (EF) for this project is not applied. 
Since it is related to the macro scale of calculating risk 
on a scale between units or between organizations and 
has been ineffective on the scale of equipment in this 
project. This deficiency leads to design and calculate 
a new factor, which is going to be called as RLF. This 
factor shows the relationship between remaining life 
and rising risk.
The RLF is an estimated measure of the risk 
associated with a useful life of equipment’s or piping 
taking into account wall thickness reduction, crack, or 
other damage mechanisms which can cause to an end 
for that item. Corrosion rate and remaining life will be 
calculated for each object as below:
CR = (to−ta)/T
RL = (ta−tmin)/CR
Where, to is original thickness (mm), ta is last 
actual thickness (mm), T is time between last thickness 
measurement and original thickness measurement 
(year), tmin is minimum wall thickness (mm), or 
tmin = (tn-CA), where tn is nominal thickness and CA is 
corrosion allowance (Table 5).
Table 5: Remaining life factor
RL RLF
RL<5 15
5≤RL<10 10
10≤RL<20 5
20≤RL 0
RLF: Remaining life factor.
 DF
The DF is a measure of the risk associated 
with common damage mechanisms that are 
either active or potentially active in operation. The 
mechanisms are categorized based on their potential 
to cause serious incidents. Therefore, to determine 
the DF following recommendations will be applied 
(Table 6):
Table 6: Damage factor
DF Definition Score
DF1 If there are known, active damage mechanisms that can cause corrosion 
cracking in carbon or alloy steels
5
DF2 If there is a potential for catastrophic brittle failure 4
DF3 If there are placed in the unit where mechanically thermally-induces 
fatigue failure has occurred
4
DF4 If there is known high-temperature hydrogen attack occurring 3
DF5 If there is known corrosion cracking of austenitic stainless steels occurring 
as a result of process 
3
DF6 If localized corrosion is occurring 3
DF7 If general corrosion is occurring 2
DF8 If creep damage is known to be occurring in high-temperature process, 
including furnaces and heaters
1
DF9 If material degradation is known to be occurring, with such mechanism as 
sigma phase formation, carburization, spheroidization
1
DF10 If other active damage mechanisms have been identified 1
DF11 If potential damage mechanism in the operating unit has not been evaluated 
and is not being periodically reviewed by a qualified material engineer
10
DF: Damage factor.
IF
The IF aims to measure the effectiveness 
of the inspection program to identify the active or 
anticipated damage mechanisms in the unit. Therefore, 
the following recommendations are applied for IF, as 
per Table 7: 
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Table 7: Inspection factor
Definition Score
Vessel inspection The inspection program is extensive (use of a variety of 
inspection methods)
−5
If there is a formal inspection program in place (visual and 
UT thickness reading)
−2
If there is no formal inspection program in place 0
Piping inspection The inspection program is extensive (use of a variety of 
inspection methods)
−5
If there is a formal inspection program in place (visual and 
UT thickness reading)
−2
If there is no formal inspection program in place 0
Overall inspection 
program
If deterioration mechanism has been identified for each 
equipment item and the inspection program is modified 
based on the result of the program using a competent 
inspector or materials engineer
−5
If the inspection program design excludes either 
identification of failure mechanisms or does not include 
critical evaluation of all inspection results, i.e., it does one 
or the other, but not both
−2
If Inspection program meets neither of the criteria of the 
previous paragraph
0
CCF
The CCF is intended to measure the 
effectiveness of plant maintenance and housekeeping 
efforts. Therefore, to explain, the IF following 
recommendations are used (Table 8):
Table 8: Condition factor
Definition Score
In a plant walkthrough, how would the plant housekeeping is judged (including painting 
and insulation maintenance program)?
Significantly better than industry standards 0
Almost close industry standards 2
Significantly below the industry standards 5
The quality of plant design and construction is  
Significantly better than industry standards 0
About industry standards 2
Significantly below the industry standards 5
In a review of the effectiveness of the plant maintenance program,  
including fabrication, PM programs, and QA/QC, they would be judged;
CCF: Condition factor.
PF
PF is a measure to indicate the abnormal 
operations or upset conditions which are prone to 
loss of containment events. Therefore, the below 
recommendations were taken into account to define the 
PF (Table 9):
Table 9: Process factor
Definition Score
The number of planned or unplanned process interruptions in an average year
0–1 interruption 0
2–4 interruptions 1
5–8 interruptions 3
9–12 interruptions 4
More than 12 interruptions 5
Assess the potential for exceeding key process variables in operation being evaluated
If process is extremely stable, and no combination of the upset condition is known 0
If only very unusual circumstances could cause upset conditions to escalate 
into an unsafe situation
1
If upset conditions are known to exist that can result in accelerated equipment 
damage or other unsafe conditions
3
If possibility of loss of control is inherent in the process 5
Assess the potential for protection devices, such as relief devices and critical sensing elements
Clean service, no plugging potential 0
Slight; fouling or plugging potential 1
Significant fouling or plugging potential 3
Protective devices have been found impaired in service 5
MDF
MDF refers to certain aspects of the design of 
operating equipment, as per Table 10.
Table 10: Mechanical design factor
Definition Score
Step 1
If equipment can be identified that was not designed to the intent of current 
codes or standards
5
If all equipment being considered in designed and maintained to the codes 
in effect at the time, it was constructed
2
If all equipment being considered is designed and maintained to current 
codes
0
Step 2
If the process being evaluated is unusual or unique or any of the process 
design conditions are extreme
0
About industry standards 2
If the process is common, with normal design conditions 5
Risk evaluation or risk ranking
Throughout a plant or process unit, risk-
ranking methodologies that apply consequence 
and probability categories, presenting the results 
in a risk matrix, are extremely effective to express 
the distribution of risks. An example risk matrix is 
shown in Figure 3. In this figure, the consequence 
and probability categories are arranged such that 
the highest risk ranking is toward the upper right-
hand corner. Regardless of the matrix selected, 
the consequence and probability categories should 
provide sufficient discrimination between the 
items assessed. Risk categories may be assigned 
to the boxes on the risk matrix. In this example, 
the risk categories are symmetrical. The results 
of RBI assessment will be used as a basis for the 
development of an overall inspection strategy.
LOF 5 H(1) H(2) H(3.5) E(4) E(5)
4 M(0.8) M(1.6) H(2.4) H(3.2) E(4)
3 L(0.6) M(1.2) M(1.8) H(2.4) E(3)
2 L(0.4) L(0.8) M(1.2) M(1.6) H(2)
1 N(0.2) L(0.4) L(0.6) M(0.8) H(1)
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
COF
Figure 3: Schematic of RBI matrix (E: Extreme, H: High, M: Medium, 
L: Low, N: Negligible)
Inspection plan
The results of RBI assessment are going to 
be used as a basis for the development of an overall 
inspection plan. In this work, inspection classification 
as per inspection grade and risk-rank is presented 
in Table 11. It indicates the maximum inspection 
interval for a component; therefore, an appropriate 
grade should be selected. It should be noted that 
the maximum interval for each inspection grade only 
acts as a guideline and each of separately assessed 
components/equipment taken all previous history and 
information into account to determine the inspection 
frequency. After the equipment risk score is obtained, 
an approach is required to determine the inspection 
time schedule and, subsequently, the development 
of an inspection plan. How to select the inspection 
grade is given in Table 11. For example, inspection 
grade 1 means that no inspections have already been 
carried out on the equipment or that there is no proper 
inspection history.
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Results
An expert team consisting of multi-disciplinary 
individuals, including operation manager, the RBI 
team leader, operations process specialist, production 
specialist, maintenance specialist, material (corrosion) 
specialist, equipment inspector, and representatives of 
the HSE, was gathered to elaborate development of 
the RBI procedure. The collected required information 
was collected from three different sources, including 
(1) the extracted data from design and manufacturing 
documents, (2) process data, and (3) repair records. 
The mentioned data sources of maintenance and 
inspection for the studied equipment parts, i.e., 
de-ethanizer section, are stored in a spreadsheet, i.e., 
excel database.
According to the results of the COF, it was 
found that 13.63% of the failure rate was at very high 
levels, 22.72% at high levels, 54.54% at a moderate 
level, and 9.09% at low levels. It was also found that 
the highest failure rate was related to de-ethanizer feed 
pre-heater (E-420), de-ethanizer reflux drum (D-406), 
and de-ethanizer tower (T-402). In addition, the lowest 
failure rate refers to nitrogen pre-heater (E-426) and 
reactor regeneration effluent cooler drum (D-412). 
Furthermore, due to the presence of water vapor, the 
lowest pollution factor was related to nitrogen pre-heater 
(E-426), and the highest rate of safety factor was related 
to de-ethanizer reflux drum (D-406), de-ethanizer feed 
pre-heater (E-420), and de-ethanizer tower (T-402). In 
terms of the production factor, important equipment is 
de-ethanizer reflux drum (D-406), C2 hydrogenation 
cooler (E-425), C2 hydrogenation reactors (R-401 A/B), 
and de-ethanizer tower (T-402).
According to the results of the LOF, it was 
found that 50% of the equipment failure were placed 
in category 1 and 50% of equipment are classified in 
category 2. The de-ethanizer reboilers (E-422 A/B) 
and C2 hydrogenation pre-heaters (E-433 A/B) as well 
as de-ethanizer tower (T-402) are recognized as the 
most vulnerable equipment to be damaged. The role 
of process and experimental factors in determining the 
category of equipment is tangible.
The obtained risk ranking results in terms of 
factors for the consequence and LOF are presented in 
Table 12, which final column shows the classification 
of the consequence with the help of the outcome 
classification guide, presented in Table 1.
Table 12: Risk level results
No. Equipment tag Risk Inspection grade Interval
1 30-D-406 H 2 48
2 30-E-420 H 2 48
3 30-E-421 M 2 72
4 30-E-422A M 1 48
5 30-E-422B M 1 48
6 30-E-423 M 2 72
7 30-E-424 M 2 72
8 30-E-425 M 2 72
9 30-E-426 L 1 60
10 30-E-430 L 2 90
11 30-E-433 M 2 72
12 30-R-401A L 2 90
13 30-R-401B L 2 90
14 30-T-402 H 2 48
15 30-D-412 L 2 90
16 C2-P-0001 M 1 72
17 C2-P-0002 M 1 72
18 C2-P-0003 M 1 72
19 C2-P-0004 M 1 72
20 C2-P-0005 M 1 72
21 C2-P-0006 M 1 72
22 C2-P-0007 M 1 72
According to the results of the risk assessment 
of the understudy equipment, it was found that 13.6% 
of the equipment expose a high-risk level, 63.63% with 
a moderate risk level, and 22.72% with a low-risk level. 
In this study, in spite of the high-risk level of (T-402) 
tower and (D-406) drum, the (E-420) heat-exchanger 
also has a high-risk score. The main reason for this is 
the high failure probability of these items. Equipment 
with risk ranks of 1 and 2 have a high level of risk 
mainly due to lack of proper history associated with 
inspection, for example, some of the equipment 
did not have a history of inspection and some had a 
one-time inspection record. In this case, if the level of 
risk of equipment is moderate and the inspection grade 
is 1, the first inspection period is 48 months, and the 
Table 11: COF and LOF results
No. Equipment Consequence of failure Likelihood of failure Risk
Cpol Csaf Cprod COF RLF DF IF CCF PF MDF EXF LOF LOF category
1 30-D-406 2 3.2 6 0.93 E 0 5 −4 6 2 0 0 9 1 H
2 30-E-420 2 2.43 6 0.87 E 0 5 −4 6 2 0 0 9 1 H
3 30-E-421 2 1.60 5.4 0.75 H 0 5 −4 6 2 0 5 14 1 M
4 30-E-422A 2 2.56 2 0.55 M 0 6 −4 6 9 0 5 22 2 M
5 30-E-422B 2 1.28 2 0.44 M 0 5 −4 6 9 0 5 21 2 M
6 30-E-423 1 3.04 5.4 0.79 H 0 5 −4 6 2 0 0 9 1 M
7 30-E-424 1 1.60 5.4 0.67 H 0 5 −4 6 5 0 0 12 1 M
8 30-E-425 1 3.20 5.4 0.80 H 0 5 −4 6 2 0 0 9 1 M
9 30-E-426 0 0.64 1.8 0.20 L 0 5 −4 6 1 0 0 8 1 L
10 30-E-430 2 1.28 3.6 0.57 M 5 0 −4 6 3 0 0 10 1 L
11 30-E-433 1 3.04 5.4 0.79 H 0 5 −4 6 3 0 10 20 2 M
12 30-R-401 A 2 3.20 2 0.60 M 0 5 −4 6 4 0 0 11 1 L
13 30-R-401 B 2 3.20 2 0.60 M 0 5 −4 6 4 0 0 11 1 L
14 30-T-402 2 3.20 6 0.93 E 5 5 −4 6 5 0 0 17 2 H
15 30-D-412 1 0.08 1.8 0.24 L 0 5 −4 6 1 0 0 8 1 L
16 C2-P-0001 1 0.60 5.4 0.58 M 0 5 −6 6 2 7 2 16 2 M
17 C2-P-0002 1 0.64 5.4 0.58 M 0 5 −6 6 2 7 2 16 2 M
18 C2-P-0003 1 0.57 5.4 0.58 M 0 5 −6 6 2 7 2 16 2 M
19 C2-P-0004 1 0.60 5.4 0.58 M 0 5 −6 6 2 7 2 16 2 M
20 C2-P-0005 1 0.64 5.4 0.58 M 0 5 −6 6 2 7 2 16 2 M
21 C2-P-0006 1 0.30 5.4 0.55 M 0 5 −6 6 2 7 2 16 2 M
22 C2-P-0007 1 0.64 5.4 0.58 M 0 5 −6 6 2 7 2 16 2 M
COF: Consequence of failure, LOF: Likelihood of failure, RLF: Remaining life factor, DF: Damage factor, IF: Inspection factor, CCF: Condition factor, PF: Process factor, MDF: Mechanical design factor.
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second inspection if the failure is not detected in the 
first inspection along with a continuous inspection plan, 
it changes to 72 months.
Regarding the results of risk assessment, we 
can use Figure 4 to better understand the frequency 
distribution of equipment inspection in different years. 
This chart helps us to make the final decision about 
the overhaul time, as well as guidance to examine 
the equipment that should be managed under risk 
management.
Figure 4: Relationship between risk rank and inspection grade
The level of risk for the equipment highlighted 
in yellow needs to be reduced before 2015 to enable 
them to be inspected in 2015 and has an acceptable 
level of risk at that time. Equipment highlighted in green 
will be capable to be delivered for inspection in normal 
operation time and in the same year without stopping 
the unit (Figure 5).
Figure 5: Frequency distribution of equipment inspection in different 
years
7 C2-P-0006
6 C2-P-0007
5 30-E-421
4 30-D-406 30-E-423 30-D-412
3 30-E-420 30-E-424 30-E-430
2 30-E-426 30-E-422A 30-E-425 30-R-401 A
1 30-T-402 30-E-422B 30-E-433 30-R-401 B
2013 2014 2015 2017 2018
Since the introduction of the RBI method, it 
has found its place in the international oil, gas, and 
petrochemical companies, and there have been many 
studies in this regard. In the oil, gas, and petrochemical 
industry of Iran, the application of this method has 
recently been considered, but unfortunately, it has not 
found its place in the form of an executive instruction.
This study was conducted on all equipment of 
a process unit as a group (de-ethanizer Unit), which is 
of high importance compared to other studies that have 
only focus on a single equipment.
Discussion
RBI could have both qualitative and quantitative 
procedure that combines the probability and the COF 
to create a prioritized list for equipment based on their 
risk. Three types of RBI have been established by API 
for ranking risk levels. Type I is qualitative RBI which 
uses a simple format to risk rank process equipment 
into a 5 rdpite of high-risk level semi-quantitative RBI, 
which is an intermediate methodology of quantitative 
RBI (Type III). Type II similarly applies a five by five 
risk matrix for demonstrating risk study results. Type 
III is quantitative RBI which is a more comprehensive 
(and more accurate) technique of risk classification for 
individual parts of equipment in a process unit. The 
applied methodology in this study is compiled from 
the possibility of equipment failure from the API 581 
standard and the consequence of the failure equipment 
from the specific process unit in ASPC. Implementing 
this method in process units is much easier, more 
practical, and more cost-effective than existing tools.
This study was conducted on all equipment of a 
specific process unit, which has a higher value compared 
to other studies that are solely unique to one or more 
separate equipment [11], [22], [23]. The results of this 
type of research will help us to determine the more proper 
time of the overhauls for the under-study unit, particularly 
for a case such as an exchanger to determine whether to 
change the overhaul time or not. Furthermore, the results 
could be used to determine the high-risk equipment in 
each unit in terms of resource allocation.
According to API 581 standard, to calculate 
LOF, six main factors are applied, one of these factors 
called the EF. This factor in the present project was 
not applied. Since it is related to the macro scale of 
calculating risk on a scale between units or between 
organizations and has been ineffective on the scale of 
equipment. This disadvantage led to the design and 
calculation of a replacement factor called the RLF. 
This factor demonstrates the relationship between 
remaining life and rising risk. It should be noticed that 
this approach has not been taken into account in any 
other previously performed studies.
In most industrial units, more than 80% of the 
entire unit’s risk is related to only 20% of its equipment 
and components [24]. This is proved by the results 
of this study that the classified equipment into five 
different levels of risk rating. In this study, the number 
obtained for high-risk equipment is 13.6%, which will 
help us focus resources (inspection, maintenances, 
and manpower costs) on only 10% to 20% of high-
risk equipment. It is worth recalling that the results are 
consistent with the previous studies mentioned in the 
research background [7], [25], [26], [27].
In all previous studies, identified risks have 
been considered from a safety point of view and 
economic interest has not been taken into account the 
issue of safe and optimal production [1], [11], [28]. In 
this study, special attention has been paid on safety, 
production, and contamination. For this purpose, the 
weights of each one are considered in the calculation 
of the consequence of the failure depending on its 
importance.
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The study has led to reduce the number of 
annual overhauls and postponed it from 2013 to 2015. 
As a result, the cost of loss of production for major 
repairs, inspection, and manpower was significantly 
reduced. That resulted in saving of $ 69,000,000 (based 
on the world price of $ 1200 per ton of ethylene and 
a production ceiling of 120 tons/h) due to avoidance 
of stopping the production for 20 days/year and $ 
1.5 million for performed routine major repairs and 
inspections.
Conclusion
RBI offers a logical, documented, repeatable 
approach for specifying the optimal inspection 
frequencies. RBI aims to confirm the emphasis of 
inspection on fields with high risk, while inspection in 
fields with low risk will also be reduced or excluded from 
the ordinary inspection plan and consequently result in 
important inspection and maintenance cost decrease. 
The use of RBI would be very useful for Iranian 
Industry, because the management of risk, and costs 
of inspection and understanding failure processes, and 
mitigation mechanisms, would be created. Application of 
RBI would be useful in improving health and safety, and 
reducing the risk of environmental hazards, and improve 
documented organization which can be continually 
developed and improved. The managersplication of 
RBIof RBI would be enhanced since the use of RBI will 
certainly have different advantages in terms of safety 
and saving maintenance costs in the organization. 
That must contain some activities such as training of 
personnel and considering some minor changes on 
procedures in management systems.
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